Someone Yuri Krupnov, Director of the Institute for demography, migration and regional development, have built a draft Federal law “On the status of large families”, which provided for the imposition of tax on small families. The tax should be levied on families with one child and not having children not for medical reasons. (proof). Well what can I say? Again, the old rake in a new package.
In fact, this idea is a little different from the infamous “tax on balls” – as in the USSR informally called the tax “on bachelors, singles and small families” (short – “tax on childlessness”), which were deducted from salaries do not have children of Soviet citizens starting from the age of 20. (this tax, however, was not taken from women who were not married). The Soviet tax on childlessness was imposed in 1941 and lasted (with some modifications) until 1990, giving concern only to accountants of Soviet institutions that were supposed to take it into account when calculating the monthly salary. Was whether this tax is to increase the population of the Soviet Union? But did not happen.
I cite as proof of his claim one plate. Plate taken from the book “Nationalities of the USSR. Ethno-demographic overview” (V. I. Kozlov, Moscow, “Finansy I statistika”, 1982, second edition). The plate is called “population of Union republics”. Take a look:
What we see here? We see that the population growth in these republics, as the RSFSR, the Ukrainian SSR and the Kazakh SSR – the main population of the Soviet Republic (Russian census 1970 was 129 million people, Ukrainians – 40,7 million people) – has been steadily declining. For example, in the RSFSR population growth for all 50 years was 15.8% and in the 60s were already 10.7 per cent, but in between 1970 and 1979, the population growth amounted to 5.7 percent. That is, every ten years the increase was reduced by approximately 5% compared to the previous decade. In Ukrainian, the USSR, the fall of growth from the 50s to the 60-m went more smoothly, but in the 70s he (the growth) have fallen sharply, reaching a rate of RSFSR of 5.6%. The Kazakh SSR showed even more impressive results – a very gradual decline in growth from the 50s to the 60-m and then a sharp collapse in the 70s. But there are of course influenced by migration processes. 50 years – the romance of the virgin lands and the mass migration to the Kazakh SSR is the youth (primarily from the Russian Federation). Hence a large increase in the 50s (the largest of all the Soviet republics of that period), which continued until 1970. And then an avalanche-like fall.
It is clear that it is necessary to consider mass migration, such as migration of youth (mainly from the RSFSR and the USSR) to the virgin, when with the demographically “laid bare” its own Republic, but “pumped” the Kazakh SSR. In 1979, when the total population of the Kazakh SSR 14.6 million people, Russian was 40.8% (of 5.99 million), Kazakhs – 36,02% (5.2 million), Ukrainians – 6,12% (898 thousand).
But still, in the whole Soviet Union also see a drop in growth from decade to decade: 1950-1959 – growth was 17.0%, 1959-1970 – 15,8%, and between 1970 and 1979 – an increase of only 8.6 per cent.
From the same table, however, shows that in the period 1959-1970 gg has been a sharp increase in population growth in these republics, Uzbek SSR, Azerbaijan SSR, Kirghiz SSR, Tajik SSR, Turkmen SSR. And even the Belarusian Soviet socialist Republic in these years showed a high increase compared to the previous decade. However, this Republic is predominantly agricultural (at least, during the periods 50’s-60-ies). For example, the Baltic republics and Armenia in the period 1959-1970 gg appreciable measurable increase, although not as rapid as in the Central Asia and Azerbaijan. And the Georgian SSR, although almost did not change the growth rate, but they didn’t fall.
So maybe in these republics have shown a positive tax on childlessness, which were deducted from salaries? But the fact is that, until 1966 (when may 18 came the Decree of the CPSU Central Committee and USSR Council of Ministers “On increasing the material interest of collective farmers in the development of social production”) in agriculture workers were not paid wages in monetary terms, and the calculation was in workdays, i.e. payment in kind as a share of total generation. After the cancellation of their labor and the transition to payment of salaries to farmers (and, consequently, the introduction of all payroll taxes, including a tax on childlessness), the growth of the population in all the republics fell (in the Transcaucasian and Baltic republics – double). And besides, traditionally in rural areas, childless families was the exception, so do this tax could not in any way affect the growth of the rural population.
But for the RSFSR and the USSR, where there was a high percentage of the urban population, such a tax was felt. This tax was 6% of earnings, with an average salary in 1975 in 145,8 RUB (BSE, 1977, volume 24-II, p. 267, table 6) was 8.75 RUB And at higher wages even more. Simplistically, the average of the wages not having children men and women pulled about a tenner – very tangible for the USSR 70-ies of the amount. But if it was a childless family, she has lost nearly two ducats monthly income. It was a very significant financial blow for the Soviet family. And yet, as you can see, it had no effect on population growth (especially in the RSFSR and the USSR), but rather, increase steadily.
Obviously, a tax on childlessness can not force a woman to give birth. But the woman ultimately decides that she will give birth or not (of which more below). Financial incentives certainly matter, but not in terms of a tax on childlessness, and in terms of material aid for every newborn. However, this alone is not enough. The woman eventually is ready to give birth only when the estimated future her children will be quite comfortable. Of course, in different regions the idea of the good future is different and is linked to national characteristics and specific standards. In addition, a significant influence of features of farming. For example, in rural areas a large number of children is the requirement of farming as a child from a very early age became an assistant on the farm, in contrast to urban families, in which children under the age of 25 can sit on the neck of the parents (both sides – parents and children – I think it is quite normal).
By the way, in this connection, let me quote one interesting table, taken from the book V. A. Belova, “the Number of children in the family” (Moscow, “Statistika, 1975”).
There are some indicators in the demographic statistics of “ideal number of children expected number of children born number of children”. Usually these values are not the same. It is clear that a woman can be considered a perfect family with five children, but expect that this economic situation will give birth to two, but in reality, the family has only one child. So all these three indicators are very important for demographic forecasting and for assessment of the current situation. We have about the ideal number of children for women major Soviet cities in the mid-1970s?
Moscow, Leningrad and Kiev – more than three children ideally want only a few percent of the residents. The majority of women finds a perfect fit 2-3 children in the family. At the same time in Moscow and Leningrad there are women who think the perfect General absence of children (Hello tax on childlessness). But the ideal number of children is always higher than expected as expected higher than the actual number of children.
To understand the difference between the ideal and expected number of children, I will give another table from the same book:
As you can see, if in Moscow the ideal number of children one child was named by only 2.0 percent, it is expected that one child called by 38.6%; the three children in the family ideal called (in Moscow) of 27.2%, as expected – only 6.3%. The rest of the numbers compare for yourself.
And another interesting table that shows how the question about the number of children a woman’s opinion is more important than the opinion of her husband.
Look at the position of the RSFSR and see that in 35% of families where the men want more children than women. However, the last word in this question is always the woman.
And therefore no wonder that in Moscow and Leningrad the families were mostly 1-2 child with the trend towards families with only one child. So, as an illustration.
I’m talking primarily about Russia (all other countries interest me only insofar as), the population of modern Russia is predominantly urban, with very high demands on the quality of life and traditionally low numbers of children in families. But what taxes can make the modern woman of traditional Russian regions to give birth to many children if she sees no serious prospects for them? High standards for life in many cities broken to smithereens on the reality of the Russian utilities sector. A plus to this growing over the last few years of the militaristic frenzy. Of course, never served in the army, but actively playing in the WoT office men can break away from the sinful earth and dream about the war, how about something interesting and beautiful. However, the woman thinks about the war on terror, which can be lost her husband and her sons, and the house will be razrastaniami (spread all over the Internet of photos from the Donbass 2014-15 G. G. more than eloquent).
Thus, what we have in modern Russia? Inflation leading to a fall in real income (and, in particular, devalues maternity capital); accumulating and it seems to have insurmountable problems with utilities, kumudini and mutual responsibility of those in power, on all levels the lost the idea of justice; but still more clearly from the upper floors you hear the saber rattling and at the bottom an increasing number of people are afraid of what may soon start a war with the US (which scared people even in the Soviet Union, which much of any war were better prepared than the current Russian Federation).
And you want to get a woman to give birth with the help of a “tax on families having fewer children”? But it is a utopia, as evidenced by the experience of the Soviet “tax on balls”.
To increase the number of children in families, we must first increase the percentage of women in surveys about the ideal and expected number of children started to call three or four or even five children. And that any taxes not achieved. This can only be achieved by successive and purposeful action of the authorities to improve the economic and political climate in the country. Only in this way, making it clear to the woman that her children is not enough that nothing will happen in the future (war and economic catastrophe), but rather they fall in a very comfortable situation, only then can we improve these indicators (the”ideal” and “expected” number of children). And only after that those or other methods (including tax), you can begin to fight for the birth (because women are morally ready for this).
And while I recommend Yuri Krupnova and the like “demographers” throw your bill in the trash. Because any real change in the birth rate it will not be affected. And the only thing it will affect is the increase in social tension in society. About how the actions of Sergei Sobyanin, who literally out of the blue (and conceiving seems to be the right thing to replace Khrushchev for new homes) has created the growth of social tension where there doesn’t be seemingly could not. And why? And all because before you write the draft laws regulating the mass of the population, have a lot to think and study the statistics.
PS: Oh and by the way, since I touched on this subject. Already from the first table (“population of Union republics”) clearly implies that by 1990 the population growth in the Russian Federation were to fall to zero, that is, the number of births and deaths was to be compared. This I mean that the patriots of the old wave in the ‘ 90s used up tons of ink and printing ink, “proving” that so-called “demographic cross” (i.e., the excess of deaths over births in 1991) is the result of the collapse of the Soviet Union and the ensuing reforms. However, anyone who is familiar with the Soviet demographic statistics, is well aware that this “demographic cross” was already predetermined in 1982. And no “tax on childlessness” here could not help and did not help. However, this is a topic for another article.