NATO and Russia — a lot of uncertainty

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НАТО и Россия — много неопределенности

Officially the Warsaw NATO summit would focus on the deployment of armed forces, missiles, as well as projects in the field of armaments. However, actually, over all this hangs a question: what to do with the powerful Russian military machine, the newly formed East? After more than two years after the beginning of political and military escalation in Ukraine, opinions differ about how to behave towards Russia. While the host country Poland urged the expansion of NATO’s presence and a tougher line against Moscow, other States want to prepare the way for discharge and for the easing of sanctions.

In particular, Poland and the Baltic countries are still trying to come to terms with the results of a survey conducted last year, located in Washington, DC Pew research center. In this survey, the majority of respondents in France, Germany and Italy have declared that they do not feel obliged to assist in case of a Russian attack on one member of NATO — although this duty is set out in article 5 of the NATO Treaty. The survey results have increased fears that the solidarity among NATO members is, to put it mildly, weak.

The right action against Moscow depend on answering the seemingly eternal question: what does Russia want? How do the Russians see themselves?

In the middle of 1990-ies Russia suffered badly from the post-Communist depression, and the then President Boris Yeltsin took the unusual step: he proposed to hold a promotional contest where participants had to answer the question “Who are we?” It was assumed that the correct answer will be obtained in the result of open competition among the citizens of Russia. They were asked to offer not that other, as “new national idea”. The idea, which would inspire new confidence in the ailing soul of the people in the former Soviet Union. Pro-government “Russian newspaper” contributed to this initiative became known throughout the country. A jury was appointed to explore the proposed options and to assess them. And the winner was to receive an award in the amount of ten million rubles — about 15 thousand dollars.

This is a rather clumsy initiative arose as a result of the great confusion of the time. Russia at that time did not understand his place in the world: whether it is in Europe? Or in Asia? Is Russia a superpower in name only? Although at the disposal of Russia, still a nuclear capability, not whether it is, at best, a regional power, considering conventional weapons and economic opportunities? And what kind of nation this was a new Russia? Multi-ethnic conglomerate, diligently trying to keep under control the many centrifugal forces? The impression that a weakened Russia no longer pays exceptionnel (FR.: exceptional country — approx. transl.), some have always considered themselves the Soviet Union.

All this happened 20 years ago. Today, the situation has not changed much. Russia still can’t decide which direction it should move, to what political and economic system it belongs, what kind of society it wants to be and what values it considers appropriate. However, the main difference is the following: in search of identity in Moscow today, in a less degree looks into himself. Rather, it tries to determine with the help of confrontation with the outside world. That is what makes Russia such an unpredictable — and many perceive it as a real threat.

Such things, of course, not included in the plans, when 25 years ago Boris Yeltsin saved glasnost and perestroika, to prevent a coup under the leadership of former Communists Gennady Yanayev and Vladimir Kryuchkov. Then all pointed to the reforms. The former satellites of Moscow has embarked on a deep restructuring. Poland in 1990, the beginning of shock therapy, Hungary has chosen the path of gradual reforms, the former Czechoslovakia organized a so-called voucher privatization, which was supposed to be every citizen was to receive his shares of large state-owned enterprises. In that moment, after the transition to the other world of the last vestiges of Soviet romance, it is the turn of Russia to implement large-scale modernization program.

However, no major reforms followed. When Mikhail Gorbachev’s ambitious program “500 days” Grigory Yavlinsky was put on the slope state apparatchiks. The same thing happened with the attempts of liberalization undertaken by Yeltsin’s Prime Minister Yegor Gaidar. And just in the year when Boris Yeltsin was trying to save the Russian soul through the competition, he completely squandered its credibility. In order to be re-elected in 1996, he used the support of the oligarchs. Using a giant PR campaign for the Russian oligarchs managed to keep him in power. Then, of course, you had to pay. And Yeltsin at a very low price gave the oligarchs that remained in public housing: rights to the extraction of natural gas, oil, raw materials. It was the last nail driven into the coffin of reform. Today the situation has not changed.

Russia in many areas continues to remain unreformed state, she chose a rather strange version of state capitalism and a blind eye to large-scale problems kleptomaniacal character. Russia has created a system that is mainly supported through the sale of energy on the world market. At the beginning of his rule, President Vladimir Putin wanted to change this. But his reformist zeal has long faded. For many years, when the price of oil and natural gas were high, and the state Treasury full of petrodollars, has not been used. Although Putin is not a supporter of a planned economy, he did not undertake efforts aimed at fundamental transformation. Why? Because reforms are often debilitating, painful. They are often heavy. Reforms are not popular, and don’t like them. Reforms can fail. And failed reforms are able to cause damage to any President. Instead, Putin used this time to consolidate his power. In political terms, this was due to the environment itself, the loyal paladins, and also by creating the so-called vertical power structure, which only works from the top down and relying on the iron fist. In economic terms, the consolidation of power was carried out by means of strengthening the old narrative, according to which it deliberate bad advice of Western experts destroyed Russia, and all the resulting confusion can only be eliminated by expanding state involvement in the economy.

With regard to security, Putin, ultimately, invested billions of dollars in modernization were in a pitiable state of the former Soviet military machine. Today, Russia has a powerful army. It is equipped with the most modern weapons systems, it is able to conduct an aggressive cyber war and its nuclear potential is comparable with the us. Although Russia has not achieved much success in Economics, at least in the military field, she was able to regain the status of superpower. Putin, therefore, went the way, well known since Soviet times. Now the President of the United States will not allow myself to call Russia a mockery of a “regional power” — as did Barak Obama in 2014.

However, the strengthening of the military apparatus in the same way as does Russia, is not a concept of the 21st century — in fact, it is, at best, a very outdated program. Moscow still perceives the world in terms of territory, square kilometers, the opportunity to drive a wedge in alliances, ententes destruction (FR.: associations, unions — approx. transl.) Today’s Russia thinks in terms of strength and subordination. While part of Europe, part of the European Union, disposes of old historical and territorial conflicts within the Union without borders and relies on the credibility of “soft power”, while the European Union brings the elements of faith in the charisma of social ideas and the attraction of economic power, Moscow demonstrates the illegal annexation of Crimea as a trophy in his showcase. Just put yourself in the place of the rulers in the Kremlin, one can understand why Russia behaves as it has done and is doing in Georgia in 2008, Crimea and the Ukraine after 2014. For some other reason the country is in the 21st century will be willing to take that risk in order to get so little in the case of Crimea we are talking about average in size and impoverished Peninsula. For this Russia has to sacrifice human life, his reputation, trade, investment, tourism, political and economic relations of all kinds. For some other reason the government will limit the work of media or drown them, arrest their critics and to interpret in their favor the laws? It all makes sense only in case, if you continue to believe in the concept of the 20th century.

Against this background, can it be considered so surprising is the fact that some Eastern European States fear for their safety? Can we consider something of a shocking fact that on the eve of the NATO summit in Warsaw Eastern Europeans expressed a desire to pursue a more large-scale maneuvers on its Eastern borders?

And finally, the question arises: what happened 20 years ago with the competition of Boris Yeltsin about the ideas? The winner won a Professor of located in the North-East of the city of Vologda. Gury Sudakov presented a more lengthy essay, and summarized his ideas in a simple formula: “Russia for me and I for Russia.” Putin would love this phrase.

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